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LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.*
I. ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER CARE AND TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Abuse and Neglect
This article last year noted the disturbing increase in the num-
ber of reported cases involving individuals prosecuted for the sex-
ual abuse of children, and the persistence of legislative efforts to
address the profound difficulties encountered by young children
called as witnesses in those cases." This year, the General Assem-
bly finally yielded to the urgings of those seeking changes in the
law, and to the recommendations of a joint legislative subcommit-
tee created in 1987 to study the problem of child abuse victims as
witnesses in the courtroom.2 The subcommittee recommended the
enactment of four bills in an effort to minimize the adverse impact
of the courtroom atmosphere on young children who testify in
child abuse cases while trying, at the same time, to protect the le-
gitimate rights of the person accused of abuse.3 All four of the pro-
posed bills were enacted into law with few amendments.
Two of the bills enacted in 1988 are paired, one for criminal pro-
ceedings4 and the other for civil matters.5 They allow the use of
closed-circuit television cameras and monitors to permit the child
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., 1959,
Washington and Lee University; LL.B., 1961, Washington and Lee University.
1. See Shepherd, Legal Issues Involving Children: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 21
U. RiCH. L. REV. 789, 796 (1987). The trend, on the appellate level, of increasing criminal
prosecutions for sexual abuse continues. See Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 319, 368
S.E.2d 263 (1988); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 529, 365 S.E.2d 237 (1988); Payne
v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 498, 364 S.E.2d 765 (1988); Marshall v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.
App. 248, 361 S.E.2d 634 (1987); Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 358 S.E.2d 415
(1987).
2. H.J. Res. 319, 1987 Sess., 1987 Va. Acts 1755.
3. H. 787, Va. General Assembly, 1988 Sess. (1988); H. 788, Va. General Assembly, 1988
Sess. (1988); S. 248, Va. General Assembly, 1988 Sess. (1988); S. 331, Va. General Assembly,
1988 Sess. (1988).
4. Act of April 20, 1988, ch. 846, 1988 Va. Acts 1696 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
67.9 (Repl. Vol. 1988)).
5. Act of April 20, 1988, ch. 845, 1988 Va. Acts 1695 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-
248.13:1 (Cum. Supp. 1988)).
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to testify in another room, out of the physical presence of the ac-
cused abuser. The criminal provision permits the use of closed-cir-
cuit television, on the motion of either the Commonwealth or the
defendant, where the child is unavailable to testify in open court in
prosecutions for kidnapping, criminal sexual assault, or family of-
fenses, involving a victim twelve years of age or younger.' If the
judge makes the requisite finding of unavailability, the examina-
tion and cross-examination of the child will take place in a sepa-
rate room with only the Commonwealth's Attorney, the defense at-
torney, the persons necessary to operate the equipment, and "any
other person, whose presence is determined by the court to be nec-
essary to the welfare and well-being of the child. ' '7 The child's tes-
timony will be transmitted into the courtroom by closed-circuit
television, and the defendant must be provided with a means for
communicating with his attorney privately and contemporaneously
during the testimony."
The United States Supreme Court decision in Coy v. Iowa,9 ren-
dered the day before the Virginia law went into effect, raises some
doubt about the validity of this provision in criminal cases. The
Court struck down an Iowa statute permitting the placement of a
screen in the courtroom between child victims of sexual abuse tes-
tifying as witnesses and the accused abuser, without any particu-
larized case-by-case determination of necessity. Justice Scalia,
writing for a plurality of four justices, concluded that the "right to
confrontation" guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Consti-
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9(B) (RepI. Vol. 1988). "Unavailability" is predicated on ei-
ther the child's persistent refusal to testify despite the judge's requests to do so, the child's
substantial inability to communicate about the offense, or the substantial likelihood, based
upon expert opinion testimony, that the child will suffer severe emotional trauma from tes-
tifying in open court. The court's ruling on unavailability must be supported by findings on
the record or by written findings in a court not of record. One court has opined that a
finding of psychological unavailability should be based on consideration of the following
factors:
(1) the probability of psychological injury as a result of testifying; (2) the degree of
anticipated injury; (3) the expected duration of the injury; and (4) whether the ex-
pected psychological injury is substantially greater than the reaction of the average
victim of a rape, kidnapping or terrorist act. Just as in the case of physical infirmity,
it is difficult to state the precise quantum of evidence required to meet the standard
of unavailability. The factors should be weighed in the context of each other, as well
as in the context of the nature of the crime and the pre-existing psychological history
of the witness.
Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821, 830 n.18 (D.C. 1981).
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9(C).
8. Id. § 18.2-67.9(D).
9. 56 U.S.L.W. 4931 (U.S. June 29, 1988).
692 [Vol. 22:691
LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
tution meant "face-to-face" confrontation, and in the absence of
"individualized findings that these particular witnesses needed
special protection" the statute and convictions under it could not
be sustained. 10
Justice O'Connor concurred in an opinion joined by Justice
White. In her view, "Confrontation Clause. . .rights are not abso-
lute but rather may give way in an appropriate case to other com-
peting interests so as to permit the use of certain procedural de-
vices designed to shield a child witness from the trauma of
courtroom testimony."11 The concurring opinion further argued
that if there were a "case-specific finding of necessity . .. [pro-
vided by a state statute] ...our cases suggest that the strictures
of the Confrontation Clause may give way to the compelling state
interest of protecting child witnesses. 1 12 Justice Blackmun dis-
sented in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. There
were thus four justices disapproving of procedures dispensing with
face-to-face confrontation and four justices that would, at the very
least, approve of its avoidance in certain matters where there was a
"case-specific finding of necessity."13
The new Virginia civil counterpart allows the use of closed-cir-
cuit television in any civil proceedings initiated in the juvenile
court, on appeal in the circuit court, or in matters involving cus-
tody or visitation pursuant to section 20-107.2 of the Code of Vir-
ginia. 1 4 The other provisions of the statute closely parallel the sec-
10. Id. at 4933-34. In a case where the defendant was absent during a pretrial hearing on
the competency of the child witnesses, the Court seemed to place more stress on the oppor-
tunity for effective cross-examination in preserving rights under the Confrontation Clause.
However, the Court pointed out that the defendant would be present during the presenta-
tion of any evidence on the merits of the case. Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2666
(1987).
11. Coy, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4934. Justice O'Connor proceeded to note the alarming propor-
tions of child abuse in contemporary society, and the proliferation of state statutes provid-
ing procedural protections for child witnesses, most of which require in some manner the
presence of the defendant. She also noted that the Iowa statute stood alone in allowing use
of a screen. Id.
12. Id. at 4935.
13. Id. During the legislative process, the Virginia General Assembly deleted from House
Bill 788 the requirement that the "courtroom setting shall simultaneously be transmitted by
closed-circuit television into the room where the child is testifying, to permit the child to
view the courtroom participants, including the defendant, jury, judge, and public." (empha-
sis added). See Act of April 20, 1988, ch. 846, 1988 Va. Acts 1696. Thus, the two-way nature
of the closed-circuit television was eliminated, casting some greater doubt on the validity of
the criminal statute than would have existed if the deleted language had been retained.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
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tion applicable to criminal proceedings, with the exception of an
allowance for the presence of the child's guardian ad litem, the
child's attorney, the defendant's attorney, and counsel for the local
Department of Social Services if the child is in the custody of the
department. 15 The closed-circuit television legislation, as were the
other two bills adopted, was modeled after a sample law promul-
gated by the National Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy
and Protection of the American Bar Association.16
The two other bills relating to child victim-witnesses are limited
to civil litigation, although they apply to a variety of proceedings,
including civil child abuse and neglect matters as well as suits
dealing with child custody and visitation.'" One bill provides for
the admissibility of a videotape of a pretrial statement by a child
victim twelve years old or under so long as the child testifies at the
trial and is subject to cross-examination or where the child is
found to be unavailable to testify on one of several grounds.' 8 The
child's recorded statement must also show particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness and reliability.' 9 The tape would be admis-
15. Id. § 63.1-248-13:1(C).
16. See R. EATMAN & J. BULKLEY, PROTECTING CHILD VICTIM/WITNESS: SAMPLE LAwS AND
MATERIALS 19 (1986). The authors of this ABA monograph suggest that two-way transmis-
sion may be necessary to satisfy the criminal defendant's right to confrontation under the
sixth amendment to the Constitution, as pointed out above. There are obviously no such
confrontation clause problems presented by the three civil bills, because the sixth amend-
ment only applies to criminal proceedings.
17. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-248.13:2, -248.13:3 (Cum. Supp. 1988). Both provisions were
assigned the same Code section by the legislature, so the Virginia Code Commission desig-
nated new section numbers. See Act of April 20, 1988, ch. 892, 1988 Va. Acts 2007; Act of
April 20, 1988, ch. 900, 1988 Va. Acts 2033.
18. The child may be found unavailable because of death, absence from the jurisdiction,
a total failure of memory, physical or mental disability, the existence of a privilege involving
the child, the child's incompetency, or the substantial likelihood that testimony in person or
on closed-circuit television would result in severe emotional trauma (based on expert opin-
ion testimony). VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:3(B)(1).
19. This determination is to be based on, but not be limited to, the following factors:
1. The child's personal knowledge of the event; 2. The age and maturity of the child;
3. Any apparent motive the child may have to falsify or distort the event, including
bias, corruption, or coercion; 4. The timing of the child's statement; 5. Whether the
child was suffering pain or distress when making the statement; 6. Whether the
child's age makes it unlikely that the child fabricated a statement that represents a
graphic, detailed account beyond the child's knowledge and experience; 7. Whether
the statement has a "ring of verity," has internal consistency or coherence, and uses
terminology appropriate to the child's age; 8. Whether the statement is spontaneous
or directly responsive to questions; 9. Whether the statement is responsive to sugges-
tive or leading questions; and 10. Whether extrinsic evidence exists to show the de-
fendant's opportunity to commit the act complained of in the child's statement.
Id. § 63.1-248.13:3(D)(1)-(10).
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sible as evidence on the merits and not merely for corroboration or
other similar purposes. 20 There are additional procedural safe-
guards requiring advance notice by the proponent of the evidence
to the other party of the intention to use the tape, and an opportu-
nity to view the tape at least ten days prior to trial.21
Similarly, the second exclusively civil bill allows for the admis-
sion of an out-of-court hearsay statement by the child if the child
testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination or is deemed to
be unavailable,22 and if the court finds the necessary indicia of
trustworthiness and reliability present.2 In both instances, the
court is required to make findings on the record, or in writing in a
court not of record, to support the conclusions on unavailability
and trustworthiness and reliability of the statements.24
The enactment of these four provisions establishes a new high
water mark in efforts to deal more sensitively with the problems of
young children victimized by abuse or neglect. The provisions es-
pecially address sexually abused children, who are called to testify
as witnesses in a court whose customary practices and procedures
may be quite hostile and traumatic to a young child.
One area in which Virginia has long had a fairly progressive rule
governing the handling of children as witnesses relates to a child's
competency to testify. In Rogers v. Commonwealth,25 the Virginia
Supreme Court upheld a trial court's decision to allow a girl two
months short of her sixth birthday and her eight-year-old brother
to testify, stating the rule in the Commonwealth to be:
There is no fixed age at which a child must have arrived in order
to be competent as a witness. Of course, no one would think of call-
ing a child two or three years of age as a witness in a case, but the
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.01 (Cum. Supp. 1987) was enacted at the 1987 General As-
sembly session by Act of March 26, 1988, ch. 448, 1988 Va. Acts 557. This section was not
reenacted at the 1988 session, and as a result, it did not become effective.
21. Id. § 63.1-248.13:3(A)(8), (C). This advance warning and opportunity for prior view-
ing may actually result in more negotiated settlements of matters, thus obviating the neces-
sity of either the testimony or the use of the videotape.
22. Id. § 63.1-248.13:2. The events constituting unavailability are identical to those out-
lined in footnote 18.
23. These criteria are substantially identical to those outlined in note 19, with the addi-
tion of considering the credibility of the person testifying about the statement and the pres-
ence of any motive on that person's part to falsify or distort the event and whether more
than one person heard the statement. Id. § 63.1-248.13:2(D)(3), (D)(6).
24. Id. §§ 63.1-248.13:2(E), -248.13:3(E).
25. 132 Va. 771, 111 S.E. 231 (1922).
19881 695
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whole question of competency must be left largely to the discretion
of the trial court, and its judgment will not be reversed except for
manifest error. He has the opportunity of seeing the child and its
demeanor on the stand, which cannot be photographed in the rec-
ord, and unless what is in the record clearly shows that he has com-
mitted error, his action will not be reversed. The child may be too
young to be convicted of perjury, but this is not decisive of its com-
petency as a witness.
In order to be competent as a witness, the child must have suffi-
cient mental capacity to observe the data about which it has testi-
fied and record it in mind, and thereafter understand questions put
to it and be able to give intelligent answers. There must also be a
sense of moral responsibility, at least to the extent of a conscious-
ness of a duty to speak the truth.26
The recent Virginia Court of Appeals decision in Royal v. Com-
monwealth2 7 pointed to the great value of a voir dire on compe-
tency that is "searching in proportion to chronological immatur-
ity.12 8 Procedurally, Virginia decisions seem to require a voir dire
examination on competency at the threshold, although a failure to
do so does not necessarily constitute reversible error.2 9 Virginia
also appears to require that the voir dire examination be out of the
hearing of the jury,30 that competency is determined as of the date
the child is offered as a witness and not the date when the events
occurred,3' that where a mental capacity issue overlays the age
26. Id. at 773, 111 S.E. at 231-32 (citation omitted). This articulation of the test draws
heavily on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wheeler v. United States, 159
U.S. 523, 524-25 (1895). Subsequent cases have confirmed this basic rule. See, e.g., Webster
v. Peyton, 294 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D. Va. 1968); Hepler v. Hepler, 195 Va. 611, 79 S.E.2d 652
(1954); Mullins v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 472, 5 S.E.2d 499 (1939) (four and one-half and
six and one-half year old children); Davis v.. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1037, 171 S.E. 598
(1933)(eight-year-old). Although the Mullins case speaks of an "understanding and appreci-
ation of the sanctity of an oath," this language has not been repeated in more recent cases,
and it goes beyond the "consciousness of a duty to speak the truth" delineated in Rogers.
Mullins, 174 Va. at 474, 5 S.E.2d at 500. There is also an early case which speaks of a
presumption of competency at age fourteen, but it has largely been ignored by subsequent
cases. Oliver v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 590 (1883).
27. 2 Va. App. 59, 341 S.E.2d 660 (1986), rev'd on other grounds, 234 Va. 403, 362 S.E.2d
323 (1987). The Virginia Supreme Court reversed the case because the trial court admitted a
prior statement by a ten-year-old witness for "refreshing the witness' memory" without a
cautionary instruction. 234 Va. at 406, 362 S.E.2d at 324.
28. Royal, 2 Va. App. at 63, 341 S.E.2d at 662 (citation omitted).
29. Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 851, 864, 44 S.E.2d 423 (1947); Mullins, 174
Va. at 474, 5 S.E.2d at 500.
30. Kiracofe v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 833, 845, 97 S.E.2d 14, 21 (1957).
31. Cross v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 62, 64, 77 S.E.2d 447, 448 (1953). Cross also stands
696 [Vol. 22:691
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concern, the test is essentially the same,32 and that the trial court's
determination of competency rarely will be disturbed on appeal.33
Virginia also has been quite explicit in holding that there is no
need for corroboration of a child abuse victim's testimony. In
Fisher v. Commonwealth,34 the Virginia Supreme Court held that
"it is clear that the victim's testimony, if credible and accepted by
the finder of fact, is sufficient evidence, standing alone, to support
the conviction."3 5
The decisions of the Virginia Supreme Court in cases addressing
the admissibility of hearsay statements made by children in abuse
cases are not nearly as hospitable to the problems of the child wit-
ness as their competency holdings. As a general proposition, a pre-
trial statement is admissible through the testimony of a hearer
where it is clearly spontaneous and was uttered under such circum-
stances that it is clear it was the product of the excitement of the
moment-an "excited utterance."" However, this rule has been
construed very narrowly by the Virginia Supreme Court in cases
involving child sexual abuse victims.
In Pepoon v. Commonwealth,37 a statement by a three-year-old
boy to his mother during a bath, some week to ten days after the
alleged sodomy, was ruled inadmissible because it was not deemed
sufficiently spontaneous and because the "recent complaint" ex-
ception to the hearsay rule was confined to rape cases.38 Similarly,
in Leybourne v. Commonwealth,39 the court rejected the admissi-
bility of a statement made by a four-and-a-half year old boy to his
mother describing an indecent touching by the defendant five
hours earlier, and after he had called to her in a "frightened voice"
for the proposition that an earlier determination of incompetency will not necessarily render
the child incompetent at a subsequent proceeding. Id.
32. Helge v. Carr, 212 Va. 485, 491, 184 S.E.2d 794, 798 (1971).
33. Rogers, 132 Va. at 773, 111 S.E. at 231.
34. 228 Va. 296, 321 S.E.2d 202 (1984).
35. Id. at 299, 321 S.E.2d at 204. This conclusion was reached in spite of an attack on
the ten-year-old victim's credibility on the basis of prior recanted complaints of sexual
abuse. Id. at 300, 321 S.E.2d at 203; see also Lear v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 187, 77 S.E.2d
424 (1953).
36. C. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA 525-29 (2d ed. 1983).
37. 192 Va. 804, 66 S.E.2d 854 (1951).
38. Note that in the later case of Fisher v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 296, 300, 321 S.E.2d
202, 204 (1984), the court alluded to the promptness of the complaint in a sodomy and
attempted rape case as corroboration of the victim's testimony. See also Marshall v. Com-
monwealth, 5 Va. App. 248, 253 n.11, 361 S.E.2d 634, 638 n.11 (1987).
39. 222 Va. 374, 282 S.E.2d 12 (1981).
1988]
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subsequent to being put to bed.40 These two cases represent a very
restrictive view of the "excited utterance" exception in child sexual
abuse cases.4'
These holdings appear to be modified by the recent decision by
the Virginia Court of Appeals in Martin v. Commonwealth.42 In
Martin, the court upheld the admission of an excited statement by
a twenty-three month old girl to a thirteen-year-old babysitter,
even though the victim was too young to testify in court. The
young victim was in the bath when Martin entered the bathroom
and, shortly thereafter, the babysitter heard the girl scream for ap-
proximately eight to thirteen seconds. He went to the door and
asked what was wrong, with the defendant replying that she had
slipped in the tub. After Martin left the bathroom, the babysitter
entered, noted the small child's reddened eyes, and again asked
what was wrong. The little girl responded, "That boy put his pee-
pee on me."'43 This was some fifteen seconds to five minutes after
the offense. The court of appeals concluded that neither the time
lapse nor the inquiry from the babysitter prevented the statement
from qualifying as an excited utterance, and said:
Moreover, particularly in the case of statements made by young
children, the element of trustworthiness underscoring the spontane-
ous and excited utterance exception finds its source primarily in the
child's lack of capacity to fabricate rather than the lack of time to
fabricate. As long ago as 1939, the [Virginia] Supreme Court, in Mc-
Cann, recognized the special reliability of a statement made by a
child "a very few minutes" after an attempted rape, noting that the
eight year old child "could not possibly have fabricated such a
story." 174 Va. at 439, 4 S.E.2d at 771. Similarly, the reliability of
C's declaration is bolstered by her lack of capacity, at age 23
months, to fabricate the statement."
The holding in Martin seems to undercut the holdings in Pepoon
and Leybourne and place a premium on laying the proper eviden-
tiary foundation for the admission of the out-of-court statement as
40. Id. at 375, 282 S.E.2d at 14.
41. See Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Is-
sues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecution, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19, 21-61 (1985).
42. 4 Va. App. 438, 358 S.E.2d 415 (1987).
43. Id. at 440, 358 S.E.2d at 417-18.
44. Id. at 442, 358 S.E.2d at 418. The court relied on McCann v. Commonwealth, 174 Va.
429, 4 S.E.2d 768 (1939), to support its conclusion.
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an excited utterance.45 Although the new hearsay exception legisla-
tion is limited to civil proceedings, it may well have an effect on
the further development of the law in this area.
A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, in a highly publicized case, also bears on the ad-
missibility of hearsay and other evidence in a sexual abuse context.
In Morgan v. Foretich,4 6 a child and her divorced mother sued the
child's father for damages arising out of alleged sexual abuse. After
a sensitive and perceptive discussion of the inherent evidentiary
problems in a case involving a young sexual abuse victim,4 the
court concluded that the district judge erred in excluding evidence
of alleged similar abuse of an older sister from a prior marriage
during periods of visitation with the defendant and his family.48
The court decided that this evidence was relevant to issues other
than character, such as identity of the abusers and negation of the
claims that the younger child's injuries were self-inflicted, caused
by her mother, or fabricated.4 The court also stated that the pro-
bative value substantially outweighed the prejudicial effect of the
evidence because of the compelling need for testimony in sexual
abuse cases where the only eye-witnesses are the young child and
the perpetrator." Similarly, the mother's testimony based on a di-
ary she kept of statements made by the young girl immediately
upon returning from visits with her father were admissible as "ex-
cited utterances." 51 The statements were admissible, even though
made as long as three hours after the events, and in spite of the
fact that the declarant was incompetent to testify as a witness, be-
cause of the different dynamics involved in a child's perception of
sexual behavior by a trusted adult.5" Finally, the court concluded
that statements made by the child to the psychologist treating her
were admissible under the medical diagnosis or treatment excep-
45. In Church v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 208, 212, 335 S.E.2d 823, 826 (1985), the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court avoided the problems of Pepoon and Leybourne by concluding that
the evidence offered there was not hearsay. See Shepherd, Legal Issues Involving Children:
Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 903, 911 (1986), for a discussion of
Church.
46. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1988).
47. Id. at 943.
48. Id. at 945.
49. Id. at 944-45.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 945-48.
52. Id.
1988]
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tion to the hearsay rule found in Federal Rule of Evidence
803(4). 5-
One other evidentiary issue in child abuse or neglect cases was
addressed by the Virginia General Assembly in 1988 by an amend-
ment to section 19.2-271.2 of the Code of Virginia. The amend-
ment completely abrogates the husband-wife testimonial privilege
in any case dealing with criminal sexual assault or abuse of chil-
dren. 4 The section previously eliminated the privilege with regard
to the abuse of the children of either or both of the spouses, but
this amendment applies to abuse of any child. 5
An amendment to section 18.2-371.1 of the Code of Virginia
broadens the Class five felony of abuse or neglect of children to
include any "willful act or omission or by refusal to provide any
necessary care."'5 6 Two further bills allow a judge entering a pre-
liminary protective order in spouse or child abuse cases to prohibit
"such other contacts with the allegedly abused spouse or children
as the court deems necessary to protect the safety of such per-
sons, '57 and to make violation of a protective order a Class three
misdemeanor. 8
In Marshall v. Commonwealth,59 the Virginia Court of Appeals
held that evidence concerning the rape of a minor, subsequent to
the one charged, and for which a defendant had already been con-
victed, was admissible at trial to show the relationship between the
parties and the fact of complaint. However, a failure to instruct the
jury on those limited purposes for the evidence was error.60 In
Clinebell v. Commonwealth,61 the Virginia Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals' affirmance of a conviction for two
counts of rape of the defendant's daughter.2 The court agreed
53. Id. at 948-50. Retired Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., dissented from this part of the
court's decision. He questioned whether a four-year-old's statements to a psychologist are
made with the frame of mind comparable to that of a patient seeking treatment, and
stressed that deference should be paid to the rulings of a trial judge on evidentiary matters.
Id. at 950-53.
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-271.2 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
55. Id.
56. Id. § 18.2-371.1 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
57. Id. § 16.1-253.1(A)(3) (Repl. Vol. 1988).
58. Id. § 16.1-253.2.
59. 5 Va. App. 248, 361 S.E.2d 634 (1987).
60. Id. at 257, 361 S.E.2d at 640.
61. 235 Va. 319, 368 S.E.2d 263 (1988).
62. The Virginia Court of Appeals decision is reported at 3 Va. App. 362, 349 S.E.2d 676
(1986), and is discussed in Shepherd, Legal Issues Involving Children: Annual Survey of
Virginia Law, 21 U. RICH. L. Rav. 789, 796 n.46 (1987).
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with the lower court that the indictments were legally sufficient
even though they failed to specify the exact dates of the offenses.
However, the court disagreed with the holdings that the trial court
had correctly excluded evidence of the daughter's prior rape accu-
sations against others and the testimony of an optometrist that the
daughter suffered from "hysterical amblyopia," a condition fre-
quently caused by a desire for attention. The court concluded that
the "rape shield law"63 did not apply to exclude the evidence of the
prior complaints as they were not being offered to show prior sex-
ual conduct, but rather to demonstrate that the daughter was
"fantasizing about sexual matters."64
Two statutes enacted in 1988 address the difficult problem
caused when a person is falsely accused of child abuse or neglect.
The first statute requires the local department of social services to
retain, for thirty days, the records relating to abuse or neglect com-
plaints that are deemed "unfounded" after an investigation. The
thirty days do not begin to run until the subject of the complaint is
notified to advise that person of procedures that may be followed
to pursue unfounded complaints made in bad faith or with mali-
cious intent. The statute establishes a procedure for securing ac-
cess to the identity of the complainant after an in camera inspec-
tion of the records by a circuit judge. 5
The second statute establishes a procedure for appeal of the lo-
cal department's conclusions in abuse or neglect cases.66 In
D'Alessio v. Lukhard,7 the Virginia Court of Appeals concluded
that a noncustodial parent of an allegedly abused or neglected
child had no standing to appeal the Commissioner of Social Ser-
vices' ruling expunging the name of a suspected abuser from-the
central registry for child abuse and neglect.68
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
64. Clinebell, 235 Va. at 322, 368 S.E.2d at 264.
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.5:1 (Cum. Supp. 1988). The bill also added "bad faith" to
"with malicious intent" in describing those complaints that are not immunized from civil or
criminal liability in VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.5 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.6:1 (Cum. Supp. 1988). The General Assembly also
adopted a resolution establishing a joint subcommittee to study child abuse investigation
procedures. H.J. Res. 127 1988 Sess., 1988 Va. Acts 2171.
67. 5 Va. App. 404, 363 S.E.2d 715 (1988).
68. Id. at 407, 363 S.E.2d at 717.
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B. Foster Care and Termination of Parental Rights
The General Assembly enacted legislation requiring a local de-
partment of social services to accept care and custody of a child,
for a period not to exceed fourteen days, pursuant to an order of
the juvenile and domestic relations district court in an emergency,
even without prior notice to the department. 9 In the case of L.J. v.
Massinga, ° the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the entry
of a preliminary injunction against the Baltimore City Department
of Social Services. The injunction requires the correction of signifi-
cant problems which were resulting in the abuse and neglect of
children who had been placed in the custody of the department for
foster care.
The General Assembly provided that where a parent of a child
enters into an entrustment agreement with a local social services
department, the parental rights of the remaining parent may also
be terminated if such termination is in the best interests of the
child and notice is given to that parent in some meaningful fash-
ion.71 Also, residual parental rights may be terminated for a child
who is abandoned and either the identity or the whereabouts of
the parent or parents cannot be determined.72
In Edwards v. County of Arlington,7 3 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals reversed an order terminating the residual parental rights of
a Korean mother who suffered from mental illness. The mother
also had significant language and cultural difficulties and a thyroid
problem that was not properly medicated. There was no real abuse
or neglect of the child, and the mother maintained persistent con-
tact with the child during periods of foster care. The court con-
cluded that a "less radical" remedy than termination of all paren-
tal rights would protect the child.74 The court of appeals also
reversed a termination of parental rights in Rader v. Montgomery
County Department of Social Services75 because both the juvenile
court and circuit court lacked jurisdiction to terminate parental
rights in the absence of a prior initial petition by the department
seeking custody of the children. The absence of a prior valid court
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279 (A)(3)(c) (Repl. Vol. 1988).
70. 838 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1988).
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279(B).
72. Id. § 16.1-283(D).
73. 5 Va. App. 294, 361 S.E.2d 644 (1987).
74. Id. at 311-14, 361 S.E.2d at 653-55.
75. 5 Va. App. 523, 365 S.E.2d 234 (1988).
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commitment of the children to the custody of the department pre-
cluded termination of parental rights.76
II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
The United States Supreme Court's decision on the death pen-
alty for juveniles in the case of Thompson v. Oklahoma77 was the
highlight of the past year. William Wayne Thompson was con-
victed of capital murder in Oklahoma for a homicide committed
when he was fifteen years old. Oklahoma had no minimum age for
the death penalty. With Justice Kennedy on the sidelines, the
Court split into three camps. Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun
joined Stevens' opinion stating that the eighth amendment's prohi-
bition against "cruel and unusual punishment" precluded the exe-
cution of a person who was under the age of sixteen at the time of
his or her offense.7 8 Scalia dissented, in an opinion joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice White. 9 Justice O'Connor supplied
the majority by concluding that the absence of a minimum age for
capital punishment constituted a lack of the deliberation and seri-
ous consideration that should accompany a death-eligible
decision.8
The Court apparently will not take long to answer some of the
questions left by Thompson. The Court granted certiorari to two
more death penalty cases only a day later, one involving an indi-
vidual who was sixteen years old when the offense was commit-
ted,81 and the other involving a seventeen-year-old murderer.2
However, Thompson does cast doubt on the constitutionality of
sentencing fifteen-year-old juveniles to death in Virginia. This
practice is possible because such minors can be transferred to the
circuit court to be tried as adults without any limitation on the
sentence that may be imposed.83 The plurality decision by Stevens
would undoubtedly preclude such a penalty in Virginia, and the
mere implication of a minimum age through the operation of the
76. Id. at 528, 365 S.E.2d at 236-37.
77. 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
78. Id. at 2696.
79. Id. at 2711.
80. Id. at 2706.
81. High v. Zant, 819 F.2d 988 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3894 (U.S.
June 30, 1988).
82. Wilkins v. Missouri, 736 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3894
(U.S. June 30, 1988).
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
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transfer statute may fall short of the deliberate decision that Jus-
tice O'Connor would require.
Nevertheless, the General Assembly has broadened the possibil-
ity of transferring a juvenile to the circuit court by providing that
such a transfer may take place if probable cause exists to believe
that the child committed a lesser-included delinquent act that
would be a felony if committed by an adult, as well as the act
charged. 4 The Virginia Court of Appeals also rendered a decision
that has consequences where transfer has taken place. In LaFleur
v. Commonwealth,85 the court opined that conviction of an offense
requiring a mandatory minimum sentence precluded the use of the
indeterminate commitment provisions of the Youthful Offender
Act.8"
In 1988, the General Assembly also continued its examination of
Virginia's treatment of "status offenders"-those children who
have engaged in misbehaviors that would not be criminal if com-
mitted by an adult. House Joint Resolution 143 continues the joint
legislative committee studying the handling of Children in Need of
Services (CHINS), and further legislation postponed until July 1,
1989, the statutory scheme for CHINS adopted in 1987.8
Further developments took place in the area of the confidential-
ity of juvenile records and the use of an individual's juvenile record
in subsequent proceedings. One act significantly revised the Vir-
ginia Juvenile Justice Information System.8 The legislature also
amended the juvenile code to allow for the release, upon the peti-
tion of the Commonwealth's Attorney, of personally identifying in-
formation about a juvenile charged with a serious delinquent act
who becomes a fugitive from justice prior to disposition."9 In
O'Dell v. Commonwealth,"0 the Virginia Supreme Court concluded
that juvenile offense records may be admitted in the penalty phase
of a capital murder case, and in McCain v. Commonwealth, 1 the
Virginia Court of Appeals determined that, during attempted im-
peachment of a prosecution witness on the basis of his juvenile rec-
84. Id. § 16.1-269(A)(3)(a).
85. 6 Va. App. 190, 366 S.E.2d 712 (1988).
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-311 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
87. Act of March 1, 1988, ch. 17, 1988 Va. Acts 16; see Shepherd, Legal Issues Involving
Children: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 789, 789-90 (1987).
88. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-223 to -225, -300, -305 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
89. Id. § 16.1-309.1.
90. 234 Va. 672, 364 S.E.2d 491 (1988).
91. 5 Va. App. 81, 360 S.E.2d 854 (1987).
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ord, the defense attorney should have been permitted to use the
phrase "not innocent," rather than "within the purview of the ju-
venile court law," as the latter may convey something less than
guilt.
Three bills enacted in 1988 dealt with the intake phase of the
juvenile court process. The first provides that petitions filed by the
Commonwealth's Attorney and department of social services must
be filed with the clerk but an attorney may file petitions directly,
except in those petitions alleging that a child is delinquent or in
need of services.2 The second provides that the juvenile court's
jurisdiction over intrafamily offenses is predicated on offenses "in
which one family member is charged with an offense in which an-
other family member is the victim. s9 3 The third provides that a
law enforcement officer investigating a motor vehicle accident may
proceed on a summons in lieu of a petition.94
Other bills allow a juvenile to be detained prior to adjudication
for up to 21 days,95 prohibit a juvenile court judge from serving on
a juvenile detention home commission,96 and provide that a juve-
nile fifteen years of age or older may be moved from a detention
facility to another such facility, or a jail, for a period not to exceed
six hours, if his or her presence creates a threat to the security or
safety of other children detained, or the staff of the facility."
Clinical psychologists were added to the list of professionals who
may recommend that the court send a child to a state mental hos-
pital for evaluation.98 The General Assembly also allowed the Com-
missioner of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance
Abuse Services to place a child fifteen or older in a state mental
hospital for evaluation, or pursuant to a commitment, a child who
has been certified to the circuit court for trial as an adult or who
has been convicted as an adult in the circuit court in an adult fo-
rensic unit where it is necessary to protect other patients, staff or
the public.9
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-260(A) (Repl. Vol. 1988).
93. Id. § 16.1-241(J).
94. Id. § 16.1-260(E)(1).
95. Id. § 16.1-277.1.
96. Id. § 16.1-249(E)(1).
97. Id. §§ 16.1-316 to -317.
98. Id. § 16.1-275.
99. Id.
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The juvenile court was given the power to entertain motions to
reconsider an order directing a person to participate in therapy,
counseling or other continuing programs. An order disposing of
such a motion is a final order for appeal purposes. 100 A child pa-
roled from state care shall be returned to a local supervising
agency after a consultation taking place at least two weeks prior to
such release. 10 1 Funds were provided to the Department of Correc-
tions to pay for continuing treatment services for juveniles placed
on parole. 0 2 Recently, the Federal District Court in Alexandria
held that a juvenile court outreach counselor was not discharged in
retaliation for his legitimate exercise of his free speech rights, and
that, even if he had been prohibited from using a religious perspec-
tive in his counseling, the juvenile court was justified in preventing
the imposition of religious views on clients of the court. 0 3
III. CHILD CUSTODY, ADOPTION, AND CHANGE OF NAME
A. Child Custody
The most significant development in the past year in the area of
child custody was the final resolution of the legislative debate over
"joint custody." The General Assembly enacted a statute that
gives both juvenile and circuit courts the power to decree joint cus-
tody, as well as sole custody, while preserving "the welfare of the
child or the children" as the primary consideration. The statute
defines "joint custody" to mean either:
(i) joint legal custody where both parents retain joint responsibility
for the care and control of the child and joint authority to make
decisions concerning the child even though the child's primary resi-
dence may be with only one parent, or (ii) joint physical custody
where both parents share physical and custodial care of the child or
(iii) any combination of joint legal and joint physical custody which
the court deems to be in the best interest of the child.'
100. Id. §§ 16.1-289.1, -298.
101. Id. § 16.1-293.
102. Id. § 16.1-294.
103. Langlotz v. Picciano, 683 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Va. 1988).
104. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-228, 20-107.2 (Repl. Vol. 1988). The legislature thus avoided
creating either a presumption or an inference in favor of joint custody, but merely added it
as an option to the court deciding custody. Although the influential case of Mullen v. Mul-
len, 188 Va. 259, 272-73, 49 S.E.2d 349, 355 (1948), has been cited to sanction joint custody
in Virginia, that decision really stands for approving of dividing or alternating custody dur-
ing the year in appropriate cases. See also Crounse v. Crounse, 207 Va. 524, 151 S.E.2d 412
(1966); Andrews v. Guyer, 200 Va. 107, 104 S.E.2d 747 (1958). There are no reported cases
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The legislation also provides that neither parent shall be denied
access to the academic, medical, hospital or other health records of
a minor child unless otherwise ordered by a court for good cause
shown.'0 5 The legislature also decided that a circuit court transfer-
ring future support or custody issues to a juvenile court for resolu-
tion may do so to any such court within the Commonwealth that
constitutes a more appropriate forum. 06
Custody cases decided or reported this year included determina-
tions that a trial court's award of custody was not plainly wrong,
especially where the appellant chose not to present evidence on his
behalf;107 that an unappealed prior custody order by a juvenile
court could only be modified by a circuit court based on a "change
of circumstances" test rather than by conducting a de novo hear-
ing;08 that the wishes of a child who has reached the age of discre-
tion should be taken into consideration and that, where possible,
siblings should be raised together; 10 that the custody of a child
will not be taken away from a parent simply because of occasional
adultery of which the child is not aware; ° and that where both
parents are fit, the court will award custody to the parent who will
provide the highest quality of care."'
In the absence of special circumstances in a custody dispute be-
tween parents and a third party, the best interests of a child are
presumed to be served by custody in the natural parents. Tempo-
rary placement of children with an aunt, while the parents relo-
cate, is not a special circumstance sufficient to overcome that pre-
sumption." 2 Also, in fixing visitation rights, a trial court cannot
in the Commonwealth explicitly approving of a joint custody arrangement similar to those
defined in the new act. Joint custody increasingly has become a popular concept with con-
siderable legislative support around the country. It is not without controversy, however. See
Cochran, The Search for Guidance in Determining the Best Interests of the Child at Di-
vorce: Reconciling the Primary Caretaker and Joint Custody Preferences, 20 U. RiCH. L.
REV. 1 (1985); Folberg, Joint Custody-The Second Wave, 23 J. FAm. L. 1 (1984-85); Freed,
Joint Custody Laws: An Analysis and Comparative Study, 9 FAMl. L. REP. 4025 (1983);
Scott & Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHio ST. L.J. 455 (1984).
105. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
106. Id. § 20-79.
107. Cousins v. Cousins, 5 Va. App. 156, 360 S.E.2d 882 (1987).
108. Peple v. Peple, 5 Va. App. 414, 364 S.E.2d 232 (1988).
109. In re Vineyard, 11 Va. Cir. 424 (Botetourt County 1976); Harmon v. Harmon, 11
Va. Cir. 402 (Botetourt County 1975).
110. Bowyer v. Bowyer, 11 Va. Cir. 472 (Arlington County 1978).
111. Rogers v. Rogers, 10 Va. Cir. 192 (Henrico County 1987).
112. Smith v. Pond, 5 Va. App. 161, 360 S.E.2d 885 (1987); see also Commonwealth v.
Mirza, 11 Va. Cir. 509 (City of Alexandria 1981).
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arbitrarily disregard a commissioner in chancery's report allowing
visitation with a mother out of state and decide the case "in light
of human experience" where there is no evidence of record to es-
tablish the facts to support such experience.113
The United States Supreme Court decided two cases dealing
with interstate custody issues in the past year. In California v. Su-
perior Court of California,1" the Court concluded that a father
and grandfather could be extradited from California for kidnap-
ping a child under Louisiana law, even though they possessed a
California decree establishing the father as the lawful custodian. In
Thompson v. Thompson,"x5 the Court resolved a dispute among
the circuits by ruling that the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
of 1980116 does not, by language or implication, create federal court
jurisdiction to determine which of two conflicting child custody de-
terminations is valid and enforceable.1 17 The Virginia Court of Ap-
peals ruled that the jurisdictional section of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act"1 does not establish the proper forum for
support matters.119
B. Adoption and Change of Name
There was considerable legislative activity in the adoption area
in the 1988 session of the General Assembly. Legislation was
passed requiring a court inquiry and a finding that the physical
and mental health of the prospective adoptive parents is satisfac-
tory to care for the child.120 Inclusion of relevant physical and
mental history of the biological parents, if known, is now required
in the adoption preliminary investigation report.121 The Commis-
sioner of Social Services will now have twenty-one days, rather
than fifteen, to notify the court of disapproval of the adoption
placement investigation report.12 2 Legislation clarifying the provi-
113. Robinson v. Robinson, 5 Va. App. 222, 361 S.E.2d 356 (1987).
114. 107 S. Ct. 2433 (1987).
115. 108 S. Ct. 513 (1988).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1738(A) (1982).
117. This decision effectively negates the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' prior holdings
to the contrary in Hickey v. Baxter, 800 F.2d 430 (4th Cir. 1986) and Meade v. Meade, 812
F.2d 1473 (4th Cir. 1987).
118. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-125(2), -126 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
119. Johns v. Johns, 5 Va. App. 494, 364 S.E.2d 775 (1988).
120. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-223(D) (Cure. Supp. 1988).
121. Id. § 63.1-223(E).
122. Id. §§ 63.1-223, -228.
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sions on the disclosure of information from adoption records was
adopted which distinguishes between identifying and nonidentify-
ing information, and narrowing access to the former. 2 3 Bills were
passed to increase the level of adoption subsidy payments124 and to
authorize the Governor to enter into interstate compacts on adop-
125tion assistance across state lines.
A final order of adoption may not be entered until the informa-
tion necessary to locate a birth certificate, or evidence of date of
birth for a foreign-born child, has been furnished to the court. 2 6 In
Frye v. Spotte,27 the Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed an order
of adoption over the objection of the natural father where the fa-
ther had deserted the family (including removal of the food and
disconnection of electricity and water), persistently refused to sup-
port the family or contact them, and had a history of severe abuse,
including sexual abuse, of the children and wife.
In the circuit court case of In re Change of Name,2 s the court
denied a petition by the divorced natural mother of the two-year-
old boy, to change his surname to her maiden name over the objec-
tion of the father. The court concluded that the change of name
was not in the best interest of the child.
IV. PATERNITY
The General Assembly was uncommonly active in 1988 in revis-
ing and amending the laws relating to paternity. Two identical
bills amended the "long-arm statute" to provide personal jurisdic-
tion in Virginia over a person who conceived or fathered a child in
the state, so long as personal service is obtained. 129 The same bills
establish a new statutory scheme for addressing the establishment
of parentage in the courts of the state, repealing sections 20-61.1
and 20-61.2 of the Code of Virginia.3O Under the new scheme, par-
entage is established prima facie: (i) for a woman, by proof of her
123. Id. § 63.1-236.
124. Id. § 63.1-238.3.
125. Id. §§ 63.1-238.6 to -238.11.
126. Id. §§ 32.1-262, 63.1-230.
127. 4 Va. App. 530, 359 S.E.2d 315 (1987).
128. 11 Va. Cir. 42 (Frederick County 1986).
129. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Cum. Supp. 1988). The request for jurisdiction must be
supported by an affidavit.
130. Act of April 20, 1988, ch. 866, 1988 Va. Acts 1789; Act of April 20, 1988, ch. 878,
1988 Va. Acts 1811.
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having given birth to the child, or by other means in the statute;
(ii) for a man prima facie by proof of a written statement of the
father and mother, made under oath, acknowledging paternity, or
by other statutory means; and (iii) for an adoptive parent by proof
of lawful adoption. 1 1
A proceeding to establish parentage may be filed by a child, by a
parent, by a person claiming parentage, by a person standing in
loco parentis to the child or having legal custody of the child, or
by a representative of either the Departments of Social Services or
Corrections. 13 2 A court considering parentage may order a blood
grouping test on its own motion or upon motion of either party.13 3
The standard of proof to establish parentage is "clear and con-
vincing evidence," and all relevant evidence is admissible. That ev-
idence may include, but is not limited to: (1) evidence of open co-
habitation or sexual intercourse between the known parent and
alleged parent at the probable time of conception; (2) medical or
anthropological evidence based on tests performed by experts; (3)
results of medically reliable genetic blood grouping tests; (4) evi-
dence of the alleged parent consenting to or acknowledging, by a
general course of conduct, the common use of such parent's sur-
name by the child; (5) evidence of the alleged parent claiming the
child as his on any statement, tax return or other document filed
with any governmental body or agency; (6) a true copy of a formal
acknowledgment of parentage; 34 and (7) an admission by a male
between the ages of fourteen and eighteen. 35
Proceedings under the parentage act are deemed to be civil. 136 A
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
132. Id. § 20-49.2. The child may be made a party to the proceedings and, if a minor and
a party, shall be appointed a guardian ad litem. The determination of a court is not binding
on any person who is not a party. Id.
133. Id. § 20-49.3. The person requesting the test shall pay for it, unless indigent, in
which case, the cost shall be paid by the Commonwealth. The court may assess the costs of
the test to the party or parties determined to be the parent or parents. The results of the
test may be admitted into evidence when contained in a written report prepared and sworn
to by a duly qualified expert so long as the results are filed with the clerk at least fifteen
days prior to trial. Id.
134. Id. § 20-49.5, allows for an acknowledgement executed on a form provided by the
Department of Social Services where a man voluntarily testifies under oath or affirmation
that he is the father of a child.
135. Id. § 20-49.4. Section 20-49.6 provides for the validity of a determination of pater-
nity or an order for support, concerning a male between the ages of fourteen and eighteen,
who is represented by a guardian ad litem. Id. § 20-49.6.
136. Id. § 20-49.7.
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judgment order establishing parentage may include provisions con-
cerning support obligations, custody, visitation, or any matter in
the best interest of the child. 1 7 If a putative father fails to appear,
after having been personally served with notice, the court may
nonetheless proceed to hear the case as if the putative father were
present.138
In Clark v. Jeter,39 the United States Supreme Court unani-
mously determined that Pennsylvania's now superseded six-year
statute of limitations for actions to establish paternity violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.140 Where
other evidence sufficiently established the chain of custody, admis-
sion of the results of human leukocyte antigen (HLA) blood tests is
not precluded merely because the courier who carried blood from
one laboratory to another was not identified.'" Nor does the ab-
sence of testimonial identification of the person who drew blood
samples for an HLA test defeat the admissibility of the results of
the test.42 A circuit court concluded that where the evidence in a
paternity suit is diametrically opposed, and the blood tests are less
than 95 per cent conclusive, paternity is not established.143
V. EDUCATION
A. Generally
In Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 44 the United States
Supreme Court upheld a North Dakota statutory scheme permit-
ting some local school districts to charge pupils a fee for transpor-
tation to school, while other districts provided free transportation.
The Court declined to apply a strict or "heightened" scrutiny to
the challenged practice, even though it placed "a greater obstacle
to education in the path of the poor than it does in the path of
137. Id. § 20-49.8.
138. Id. § 20-61.3.
139. 108 S. Ct. 1910 (1988).
140. Id. at 1916. The Court had previously struck down a one-year statute of limitations
for paternity proceedings in Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982), and a two-year limita-
tion in Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983).
141. Dotson v. Petty, 4 Va. App. 357, 358 S.E.2d 403 (1987).
142. Commonwealth v. Harrison, 5 Va. App. 8, 360 S.E.2d 212 (1987). The newly enacted
Parentage Act provides that "[v]erified documentary evidence of the chain of custody of the
blood specimens is competent evidence to establish the chain of custody." VA. CODE ANN. §
20-49.3(C) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
143. Commonwealth ex rel. Williams v. Herman, 11 Va. Cir. 92 (Hopewell 1987).
144. 56 U.S.L.W. 4777 (U.S. June 24, 1988).
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wealthier families.' 1 45 Justice O'Connor reiterated that education
was not a fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny when govern-
ment interfered with access, 14 6 and that the intermediate scrutiny
test was limited to cases involving discrimination based on gender
or illegitimacy. 147 Justice Marshall dissented, in an opinion joined
by Justice Brennan, wherein he condemned the Court's "retreat
from the promise of equal educational opportunity by holding that
a school district's refusal to allow an indigent child who lives [six-
teen] miles from the nearest school to use a schoolbus service with-
out paying a fee does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause.' 48 Justice Stevens joined by Justice
Blackmun also dissented.
The Virginia General Assembly reenacted its 1987 legislation di-
recting that school divisions could not begin the school year until
after Labor Day,14  and it adopted new Standards of Quality to
govern the schools of the Commonwealth.'5"
B. First Amendment and Other Student Rights
The Supreme Court upheld censorship of a student newspaper
by a high school principal, in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,'5' on the grounds that the paper, published by a jour-
nalism class, did not qualify as a "public forum" and the excision
of two pages, on the basis that articles therein unfairly impinged
on the privacy rights of other students, did not violate first amend-
ment freedom of speech. However, in Crosby v. Holsinger,5 2 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a summary dismissal sua
sponte on frivolousness grounds of an action seeking a preliminary
injunction against a ban of a high school's "Johnny Reb" mascot.
In Burnham v. West, 53 the district court concluded that general
searches for "magic markers", marijuana and portable radios con-
ducted at a middle school by teachers, under the direction of the
principal, violated the fourth amendment. The court stated that
145. Id. at 4779.
146. Id.; see San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-36 (1973).
147. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
148. Kadrmas, 56 U.S.L.W. at 4781 (U.S. June 24, 1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-79.1 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
150. Id. §§ 22.1-253.13:1 to -253.13:8.
151. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
152. 816 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1987).
153. 681 F. Supp. 1160, 1167-68 (E.D. Va. 1987), modified in part, 681 F. Supp. 1169
(E.D. Va. 1988).
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there were no reasonable grounds at the inception of the search to
suspect that any particular student had the prohibited items or
substances.5
C. Rights of Handicapped Students
Congress took a significant step to reverse the effect of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v.
Bell1 55 when it adopted the "Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987. ''1 5 The purpose of the Act is to address discrimination on
the basis of race, gender, handicap or age in any program of an
educational institution that receives any federal funds. In Honig v.
Doe, 57 the United States Supreme Court concluded that the "stay
put" provisions of the Education of the Handicapped Act"" pre-
cluded the unilateral exclusion of educationally handicapped chil-
dren from school for dangerous or disruptive behaviors, without
utilizing the procedures for addressing changes of placement under
the federal Education for the Handicapped Act.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided several cases con-
cerning reimbursement of parents for special education. Where the
district court decided that the public school placement decision
was appropriate and no procedural violations occurred, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that parents' unilateral decision to withdraw
their son from the public schools and place him in a private setting
did not preclude reimbursement for that placement.159 In a second
case, the court dismissed as moot an appeal challenging North Car-
olina's refusal to allow administrative hearing officers in special ed-
ucation cases to award tuition reimbursement to parents who have
successfully proven that the public school program is inappropri-
ate.160 The court also affirmed a district court decision finding
grievous procedural defects in a school board's handling of a par-
ents' special education claims and awarding substantial amounts
for tuition and related expenses in a private placement.1 6'
154. Id. at 1165-66.
155. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
156. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified in
scattered sections of 20, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
157. 108 S. Ct. 592 (1988).
158. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3).
159. Hudson v. Wilson, 828 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987).
160. S-1 v. Spangler, 832 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1987).
161. Board of Educ. v. Dienelt, 843 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1988).
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Likewise, the District Court for the Western District of Virginia
decided that procedural due process required a prompt administra-
tive hearing on claims by parents of handicapped students, and the
student should be kept in his current placement while disciplinary
proceedings took place. 6 2 In addition, the court declared that
available administrative procedures, under the Education of the
Handicapped Act, should be exhausted before resorting to litiga-
tion.16 3 Also, the court held that parents were barred from recover-
ing reimbursement for private placement tuition after a school sys-
tem offered an appropriate educational placement for their
child.26 4 The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia de-
cided that handicapped students and their parents had no right to
remove cases brought by school divisions in state courts to federal
court, in order to challenge decisions of administrative reviewing
officers. 65
In Beasley v. School Board of Campbell County,6 " the Virginia
Court of Appeals ruled that the court had jurisdiction over an ap-
peal from a circuit court decision reversing the decision by an ad-
ministrative hearing officer determining the rights of a handi-
capped child. The court further concluded that the hearing
officer's decision that the public school was not providing an ap-
propriate education was correct. 67 In Erickson v. City of Rich-
mond School Board,"' the circuit court judge decided that an indi-
vidualized education program (IEP) was not rendered
inappropriate by the fact that a learning disabled student with
above average intelligence would benefit more from a better pro-
gram in the public schools.
VI. MISCELLANEOUS
In Hartigan v. Zbaraz,"' an equally divided United States Su-
preme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' deci-
sion 17 0 that portions of the Illinois Parental Notification Act deal-
162. Doe v. Rockingham County School Bd., 658 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Va. 1987).
163. See Davenport v. Rockbridge County School Bd., 658 F. Supp. 132 (W.D. Va. 1987).
164. Rouse v. Wilson, 675 F. Supp. 1012 (W.D. Va. 1987).
165. Amelia County School Bd. v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 661 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Va.
1987).
166. 6. Va. App. 206, 367 S.E.2d 738 (1988).
167. Id. at 213, 367, S.E.2d at 742.
168. 9 Va. Cir. 172 (City of Richmond 1987).
169. 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987).
170. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985).
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ing with abortions by minors were unconstitutional. In Winchester
Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Boyce, 17 1 the Circuit Court of Frederick
County held that an elective abortion performed on an unemanci-
pated minor is not a necessity for which the minor's parents are
legally responsible. In Houchins v. Kennedy's Piggly Wiggly
Stores, Inc.,7 2 the circuit court judge ruled that a child born alive
does not have an independent cause of action for injuries suffered
prior to birth, through the negligence of another. Legislation hav-
ing implications for an increasing number of Virginia mediation
programs that impact on children, provided confidentiality to me-
diation communications and immunized mediators and mediation
programs from civil liability for acts or omissions in the absence of
bad faith, malicious intent, or willful and wanton disregard of the
rights, safety, or property of another.17 3
171. 10 Va. Cir. 541 (Frederick County 1984).
172. 10 Va. Cir. 392 (Wise County 1988).
173. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.21 to -581.23 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
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